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Foreword
It is not a novelty that emerging market economies are prone to poor institutions, additional
layers of uncertainty and lack of transparency. There is quite a significant body of literature
that shows the negative effects due to lack of transparency. Among others, Gelos and Wei
(2005) provide evidence that less transparent countries receive less investment and that
during crisis they are more likely to experience high capital outflows.1 Marques, Gelos, and
Melgar (2013) document that more opaque countries suffer more from financial globalization.
Several economic crises have been partially worsened by lack of transparency. For in-
stance, in the recent Asian crisis, Thai government has been accused of allowing an ex-
tremely opaque financial sector to flourish. It is considered to be one of the key elements
that triggered the financial turmoil in 1997. The 2008-2009 debt crisis has shown that, even-
tually, no country is shielded from high interest rate spreads, unsustainable debt and lack
of transparency. Even developed countries like Spain and Greece have been undermined by
revealed hidden debts, economic uncertainty and respectively unaffordable borrowing costs.2
The lack of transparency practiced by a range of countries is puzzling.
In present work, I study the implications of information asymmetry, that appears be-
tween government and lenders, on economic outcomes and analyze the conditions when
governments prefer to be less transparent about their states of economy. In particular, the
thesis focuses on the joint dynamics of asymmetric information between market participants
1See Gande and Parsley (2014), Bernoth and Wolff (2008), Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), Alt, Lassen, and
Rose (2006), etc, for different aspects of economy that can be affected by lack of transparency.
2In March 2011 Spanish local governments revealed the accumulated debts which haven't been shown
previously.
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CHAPTER . FOREWORD
and sovereign debt and default.
In part I, Sovereign Debt and asymmetric market information", I show that in an en-
vironment when government is less uncertain about the future state of the economy than
lenders are, the former ends up borrowing higher amount of debt and defaults more often. I
start with bringing some evidence that shows a positive correlation between the debt to GDP
level and future economic uncertainty (proxied by root mean square of GDP growth forecast
errors) for different countries. Then, I extend the recent quantitative models of sovereign
default by allowing asymmetry in information between the government and foreign lenders.
The key ingredients are the information about future endowment and its accuracy which are
received by market participants. The obtained results can be explained by the fact that in an
environment when lenders observe more accurate information, the gains for the government
when lenders observe good news are less than costs that are coming from lenders observing
bad news. Therefore, on average, government ends up borrowing more when lenders are less
informed about future endowment and offer a relatively better price. Chapter 1 focuses on
the mechanism of the model and explains how the information precision affects the level of
demanded debt. In chapter 2, I simulate a small open economy and compare the results to
the existing literature of endogenous sovereign default.
In part II, Optimal Transparency", I study the economic conditions when government
prefers to be less transparent about its state of economy. For this purpose, I develop a dy-
namic model of endogenous sovereign default with private information where both govern-
ment and lenders act strategically and can update their beliefs upon observing government's
actions. I find that a government prefers to be opaque when it is overindebted, expects a
more severe crisis, but with a lower probability. The first two results are intuitive. A gov-
ernment that has high current debt or expects that recession is going to be more pronounced
depends more on the external resources to finance its consumption. Therefore, a government
that is experiencing a boom prefers to bear the cost of lower asset price so that it can enjoy
a higher consumption if, eventually, a crisis comes.
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Additionally, I show that government prefers to be less transparent when it is more
likely to have better times; and commits to disclose fully its state when it expects more
likely to have bad times. If the probability of an upcoming crisis is very high, uninformed
lenders increase the costs of borrowing. As a result, the optimal amount of debt under null
transparency is close to the level that government in a crisis can borrow even if it reveals its
state. Hence, government prefers to be fully transparent and enjoy higher consumption if it
ends up in a good state during high probability of a crisis. If a recession is less likely, the
price offered by lenders increases, the amount of debt that a non-transparent government
can borrow is higher and as a result, benefits from being opaque also rise.
Chapter 4 suggest some potential areas for future research.
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Sovereign debt and asymmetric market
information
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Introduction
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) wrote in their book This time is different that ..., one would
think a strong case could be made for less profligate governments to open up their books more
readily and be rewarded for doing so by lower interest rates. This transparency, in turn,
would put pressure on weak borrowers. Yet today even United States runs an extraordinarily
opaque accounting system.... The lack of transparency exhibited by so many governments
is puzzling.
In the first two chapters, I show that difference in quality of information that market
participants have, can lead to higher amount of borrowing and, consequently, higher proba-
bility of default. For this purpose, I build a model of small open economy with endogenous
sovereign default and allow agents to receive signals about future fundamentals with differ-
ent accuracy. The information regarding macroeconomic fundamentals available to public
is relevant for decision making. It acts through expectations of future economic outcomes,
affects the interest rates and, ultimately, the level of contracted debt and decision to default.
It is a standard paradigm that, during good times, government wants to reveal all the
information to take advantage of better offers and vice-versa when it expects bad times. In
this part, I abstract, however, from government making any choice regarding the amount of
information to reveal and concentrate only on the explaining the mechanism of the model
when government is more informed than lenders. I extend this model by allowing government
to choose the level of optimal transparency in chapter 3.
I first bring some evidence of behavior of debt and uncertainty regarding the future
12
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fundamentals. I document a positive relationship between root mean square (RMSE) of
GDP growth forecasting errors and the debt to GDP level for different countries. RMSE
may be thought as an indicator of future economic uncertainty, which is characteristic to
countries that lack transparency. Thus, the countries that register a lower transparency on
average borrow more.
When government observes better information in comparison to lenders, there are two
mechanisms at play. Firstly, once government knows better the future output, it demands
less precautionary savings and therefore borrows more. Secondly, less informed lenders, due
to higher uncertainty they face, offer a relatively better price when government expects bad
output.
The same time, less informed lenders offer a relatively lower price in good times, decreas-
ing the demand for debt. However, since government is better informed about its future state
and expects good times to be more likely, due to consumption smoothing it will be willing to
borrow more. Therefore, due to lenders lack of information, the amount of debt it expects to
borrow when it is in bad times is higher than the amount of debt that government foregoes
when it expects to be in good times. Especially, the effect is stronger when government is
overindebted.
Government that expects higher output will respond less to an increase in the price
when lenders observe more accurate information. Conducted by consumption smoothing
behaviour, government was borrowing an already high level of debt. But, will drop signifi-
cantly the borrowing level, or even default when lenders observe an accurate bad signal and
offer a slightly high credit cost. So, the gains from observing good signals increase less than
the costs that are coming from lenders observing bad signals.
The model is an extension of vast literature on sovereign default, started by Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981). Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) extended the general
equilibrium model with endogenous sovereign default to study business cycles in emerging
economies. Several other papers came with different assumption to account for relatively
13
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low level of debt generated by the model and other facts left unexplained. Lizarazo (2011)
relaxed the assumption of neutral lenders receiving a combination of higher level of debt
in equilibrium and higher and more volatile spreads. Mendoza and Yue (2012) construct
a general equilibrium model with endogenous output cost along with endogenous default
rate. Our paper extends this literature by introducing private information and looks at its
implication on the behaviour of sovereign debt and default rates of a country.
Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013) build a similar set-up to account for the fact that
sovereign default happens not only in bad times, a fact empirically found by Tomz and
Wright (2007). In contrast to their model I assume that economy receives signals that are
not publicly available to all the agents.
In addition, by introducing the asymmetric information, the model is able to generate
some business cycle statistics that are more closer to the one observed in the data for emerging
markets, in particular less consumption smoothing and more pronounced negative correlation
between output and interest rate spreads.
In allowing for the fact of lack of full information between government and lenders, the
model connects to several studies that find the former to be a key determinant in fluctuations
of sovereign spreads. Catao, Fostel, and Ranciere (2012) introduce the fiscal discoveries" in
a three-period model to explain the decouplings in cross-country bond yields after prolonged
periods of convergence. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) focuses on the lenders inability to dis-
tinguish between borrowers characteristics and preferences to match the fact that countries
with histories of default are charged higher interest rates than countries with no repayment
difficulties. In these papers investors learn from the country's action, updating their beliefs
about future types of borrowers and re-pricing of sovereign bonds along the way. In order
to match the empirical facts they exploit the use of additional assumption as higher costs
of default, and very low discount factors, etc. I abstract from the signal extraction problem
as it is beyond the scope of this model. The present work adds to this strand of literature
by assessing the effect of precision of future fundamentals on contracted level of debt and
14
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probability of default.
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that globalization may promote contagion by weakening
incentives for gathering costly information about each country's fundamentals. Therefore,
investors would rather follow the market" than take the time and expenses to make their
own assessments. Following this argument I assume that investors receive an external signal
regarding future fundamentals which may be more or less precise, mimicking the investors
herding behaviour.
I calibrate the model of Arellano (2008), that is a particular case of the model, when par-
ties have no information regarding future output. Then, I consider cases where government
and lenders receive signals about future output with different levels of precision. I find that
when government's signal becomes more informative relative to the lenders' one, the level
of contracted debt almost triples in comparison to the no-signal economy. In addition, the
business cycle moments for the case when lenders observe worse quality information than
government about latter's fundamentals, are much closer to the values observed in the data
for emerging markets. The variation of the consumption is higher (1.23) and the correla-
tion between output and interest rate spread is negative (-0.39). Hence, transparency and
asymmetry of information between lenders and governments may play an important role in
explaining the differences between emerging and developed countries.
0.1 Motivating Evidence
Further, I provide some evidence as to whether difference in uncertainty regarding future
fundamentals is related to different levels of debt. For this purpose, I compute the standard
deviations of the forecast errors of GDP per capita growth and compute the correlation
between RMSE and level of debt for a group of emerging countries.
Let's define the forecast of GDP per capita growth at time t+1 as yˆt+1|t, then the forecast
15
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Figure 1: RMSE and Deb/GDP ratio for middle income countries
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error is given by:
εt+1|t = yt+1 − yˆt+1|t
Forecast errors are estimated by means of ARIMA model using real gdp per capita data
for 131 countries over 26 years, from 1980 till 2005. The summary of standard deviations of
the difference between predicted and observed values is given in the appendix A3. Higher
root mean square error (RMSE) shows a higher uncertainty regarding forecast variable for
a given country.
In order to show the plausibility of the fitted model and received results, I plot the
relationship between RMSE and gdp per capita. Figure 4, shown in the appendix, displays a
negative relationship which says that more developed countries show a lower uncertainty in
the economic forecasts. The simple ARIMA estimation yields a standard deviation of forecast
errors 98% higher for Latin American countries in comparison to high income countries.
This is consistent with the findings in Timmermann (2007) regarding the World Economic
Forecast reported by IMF. He documents that the average standard deviations of forecast
errors of GDP growth for advanced economies is 1.35 while for developing Asia and for
16
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Figure 2: RMSE and Debt/GDP
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(a) Low income countries
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(b) High income countries
Western hemisphere are 2.22 and 2.41 respectively. One of the reasons of having higher
uncertainty is the lower transparency characteristic for emerging and developing countries.
Next, I present the evidence regarding the relationship that exists between uncertainty
about future fundamentals, namely, RMSE of gdp per capita growth and the debt to gdp
ratio. In figure 1, I plot the RMSE and debt to GDP ratios for middle income economies as
defined by the World Bank3. There is a clear evidence that, whenever countries have higher
RMSE of GDP per capita growth forecast, they also register higher levels of debt. This graph
does not have the final aim at figuring out the causality relationship, but rather to show
the correlation that exists between these 2 variables. It can be the case that higher level of
debt brings with it higher uncertainty as the country's position maybe more vulnerable when
it is overindebted. However, it also maybe the case that governments are able to rollover
higher amounts of debt as a result of lower transparency that can be one of the reasons
of registering higher uncertainty. The intuition behind is the following. Less transparent
country can more easily hide the expected bad stand tomorrow and therefore take advantage
of relatively better price debt. As a result, it is able to accumulate and sustain higher amount
of debt.
A similar pattern can be observed for the other two income groups, low and high income
3http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015-country-classifications
17
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countries. Groups are differentiated by gross national income per capita as it is specified by
World Bank. In figure 2 can be seen the positive relationship between forecast error standard
deviation and the level of debt for high and low income groups.
In what follows, I will develop a model that is able to generate higher levels of debt
for the cases when foreign lenders have less accurate information regarding future country's
fundamentals.
The structure of the rest of the part I is the following. In chapter 1, I set up a two period
building block model to explain the main mechanism. In chapter 2, I extend it to an infinite
horizon model by describing the environment and its key elements. In section 2.2, I simulate
a small open economy and discuss the main results of the paper.
18
Chapter 1
Sovereign debt and asymmetric market
information: Mechanism
1.1 Two-period building block model
This chapter lies down a two-period model with endogenous sovereign default. Consider
an environment where the time is discrete, t = 1, 2. There is a small open economy with
a representative household, government and foreign lenders. Household is maximising the
stream of consumption over two periods which is composed from a stochastic endowment
and a government transfer. The government smooths household's consumption by trading
one-period non contingent bonds in a credit market. The gains/losses are passed to the
household in form of the lump sum transfers. There is a large number of identical risk
neutral foreign creditors which will lend any amount needed for a given price function.
Economy receives an initial endowment, yl < y0 < y
h; and y ∈ (yh, yl) in the second
period, drawn by nature with probability Pr(yl) = λ. In addition, in the first period, foreign
lenders (f) and domestic government (g) receive each a signal si ∈ {si,h, si,l}, ∀i ∈ {g, f}
regarding the realization of the next period endowment. The signals received by the agents
may not coincide. The probability of receiving a particular endowment given the signal is
19
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specified below.
By comparing the net benefits of the two options, the government chooses whether to
repay or default. If it defaults it is not allowed to participate in the credit market further
on. In case it decides to repay, it chooses the amount of optimal debt to contract for
a given price schedule. Then, the consumption takes place and the next period follows.
The price schedule depends on the level of debt and the probability of the government not
repaying it in the next period, as perceived by the foreign lenders. Once the government
participates in the credit market, it observes the signal received by the lenders through the
offered price. In this set-up I abstract from any learning and updating of the lenders' beliefs
after observing the contracted debt.1 Hence, while government is able to learn the lenders'
signal from the price schedule they offer, the latter are rationally bounded and are unable
to extract any information from government's actions. This assumption is supported by the
findings in Romer and Romer (2000) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) that argue that even
more developed countries have better information due to among other reasons their desire
of hiding the weaknesses in financial systems, vast resources they devote to forecasting and
are not available to general public, etc.
At the beginning of the second period, nature draws the endowment. There is no credit
market in this period, i.e the government does not contract any new debt. However it has
to decide whether to repay the debt contracted in the previous period. In order to make
government's repayment decision viable, I assume an exogenous continuation value that is
higher in the repayment state. Given that this is the final period of the economy and there
is no credit market, I assume that the signals regarding future states are irrelevant. I relax
this assumption and increase the state space in the next chapter, where I set up an infinite
horizon model. In order to keep things simple I abstract from it in this chapter.
1I will develop a model that relaxes this assumption in chapter 3.
20
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1.1.1 Household
Household's preferences are given by the utility function:
U = u(c1) + βEtu(c2),
where ct is the current consumption and β ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor. Utility function
is strictly increasing, weakly concave and twice differentiable.
The household does not participate in the credit market, instead receives an amount of
transfers from the government in a lump-sum fashion. For numerical part I assume a log
utility function u(c) = log(c).
1.1.2 Government
Government's objective is to maximize households' utility function. It smooths the con-
sumption by borrowing in the foreign credit market at a price q(bt+1, s
f ). It transfers all
the proceeds to consumers. Financial markets are incomplete since the government trades
only one period, non contingent bonds, b. Sovereign debt is not enforceable, therefore at the
beginning of each period government decides whether to default or not. The decision comes
from comparing the benefits from the two states. The default decision has a cost in the form
of a lower endowment and a lower future value function. This mimics the fact that, during
default episodes, a country might be excluded from financial market that causes disruption
in the private sector's access to credit and therefore, reduces output. Mendoza and Yue
(2012) provide a theoretical model that explains such a loss in output during default. In
addition, if the government abstains from repaying the outstanding debt it can no longer
trade in the credit market.
Emerging economy's resource constraint when the government decides to continue the
repayment is:
21
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ct = yt − bt + q(bt+1, sf )bt+1,
and when it decides to default:
ct = y
def ,
where ydef < min{y, E(y)}. The government optimization problem can be written in a recur-
sive dynamic form. Given the state variables (y, sg, sf, b), the value function when government
has access to international market is V (y, sg, sf, b). Every period it decides whether to default
or not by comparing the two options:
V (y, sg, sf, b) = max{V D(y, sg), V ND(y, sg, sf, b)},
where V D and V ND are the values if the government defaults and, respectively does not.
The value functions are defined below. I solve the problem using backward induction.
Backward induction: period t = 2
In period 2, the government observes the endowment and decides whether to default and
consume the current endowment, or to continue the repayment and consume the leftover after
clearing the debt. I abstract from any signal in period two, therefore, the only state variables
are the endowment, y and debt, b if the government repays. Government's continuation
values in each of the states are denoted by V Dfut and V
ND
fut .
If the government defaults it consumes the output less the penalty cost, ydef , and the
value of defaulting is given by:
V D2 (y2) = log y
def + βV Dfut,
If the government does not default, the value of not defaulting is the sum between the
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utility from consuming the endowment less the debt and the discounted continuation value
of repayment:
V ND2 (y2, b2) = log(y2 − b2) + βV NDfut .
The optimal default decision of the government is characterized by the comparison of the
two values. The functional form of government's default decision is given by:
D(b2) =
 1, V
D
2 (y2) > V
ND
2 (y2, b2),
0, otw.
After some manipulation I can formulate the probability of default, δ(b2), on a given level
of debt b2:
δ(b2) =

1, b2 >
yh∆−ydef
∆
,
0, b2 ≤ yl∆−ydef∆ ,
Pr(y2 = y
l) = λ, y
l∆−ydef
∆
< b2 ≤ yh∆−ydef∆
(1.1)
where ∆ is the discounted cost of government being deprived of participating in the credit
market, log(∆) = β(V NDfut − V Dfut).
In the setting of a two period model with two states of the economy, the government has
the option to choose between three levels of debt. If it chooses to borrow an amount smaller
than the maximum one that it is able to repay in bad times, bL = y
l∆−ydef
∆
, it defaults with
probability Pr = 0. If it chooses an amount of debt higher than the maximum it can repay
in good times, bH = y
h∆−ydef
∆
, it defaults with probability Pr = 1. If it chooses any amount
between these two values it defaults with probability of receiving a low endowment. Clearly,
choosing a level of debt higher than it can repay in good times will never be an equilibrium.
Period t = 1
At the beginning of period t=1, government observes the current endowment and the signal
regarding future state. Given the initial amount of debt it decides whether to default and
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consume the output, ydef in both periods or repay and keep having the access to the available
resources in the credit market.
When the government chooses to repay, it forms the expectations about the future re-
alization of endowment conditional on the signal it receives and decides upon the level of
debt subject to resource constraint. The signal has a predictive character. Higher is the
probability that the government receives today a signal about the true realization tomorrow,
more informative is the received signal.
For simplicity I assume that the set of states has the same length as the set of signals.
High signal precision means that probability of receiving a low signal given that nature
draws a low realization of the output tomorrow, Pr(sl1|yl2), is close to one. For simplicity, I
assume that the probability of signal's precision is symmetric, Pr(sh1 |yh2 ) = Pr(sl1|yl2) = ψ.
Respectively, Pr(sh1 |yl2) = Pr(sl1|yh2 ) = 1− ψ.
Probability of receiving a particular endowment given a signal is given by the Bayesian
formula. Equation 1.2 shows the probability of receiving high output tomorrow conditional
on receiving high signal today.
Pr(y2 = y
h
2 |sg,h) =
ψg(1− λ)
ψg(1− λ) + (1− ψg)λ, (1.2)
Given the states y1, b1, s
g, and the asset price function, q1(b2, s
f ), government maximizes
the problem (1.3) in the first period.
V1(y1, s
g, sf , b1) = max{V ND1 (y1, sg, sf , b1, ), V D1 (y1, sg)}, (1.3)
where the value of not defaulting is:
V ND1 (y1, s
g, sf , b1) = maxb2 log c1 + β[Pr(y
l
2|sg1)V2(yl2, b2) + (1− Pr(yl2|sg1))V2(yh2 , b2)],
s.t. c1 = y1 − b1 + q1(b2, sf )b2.
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The value of government deciding to renege on its obligations is given by:
V D1 (y1) = log y
def + βV D2 . (1.4)
The optimal level of debt is a function of the signals received by the agents, sf and sg. Hence,
the signals received today affect the expected probability of default and, therefore, the asset
price. The asset price function, q1(b2, s
f ) will be discussed below.
1.1.3 Foreign lenders
Lenders are risk neutral and will lend any amount needed at a risk free rate. Lenders are
operating in a competitive market, therefore their profit satisfy zero profit condition:
0 = −qb2 + δ
f (b2, s
f )
1 + r
0 +
(1− δf (b2, sf ))
1 + r
b2, (1.5)
δf is the probability of the government not honouring its debt as perceived by lenders. The
signal received by lenders may differ from the government's one, since lenders are assumed
to not being able to update the information set from government's choice of debt. Therefore
government's probability of default, as perceived by lenders, depends only on their own
signal about future government's state. This assumption is based on the fact that often
official data is little reliable and government hides the weaknesses in financial systems as it
is documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Another explanation, provided by Romer and
Romer (2000), is that government may posses information about the state of the economy
that is not known to the large public due to the vast resources that the former devotes to
forecasting.
The first term shows that the lenders buy the discount bond issued by the government at
a price q. Next period, the foreign lenders receive the face value of the bond with probability
of repayment, 1− δf (b2, sf ).
Probability of receiving high endowment conditional on the observed signal is given by
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Bayesian formula that has exactly the same form as eq (1.2). The bond price functions is
then equal to:
q(b2, s
f ) =
1− δf (b2, sf )
1 + r
(1.6)
1.1.4 Qualitative analysis
This section aims to explain the intuition of the model's mechanism and expected results.
As a benchmark model I take the one where the signal is symmetric and non-informative.
This is the simplified version of the model described in Arellano (2008). Step-by-step, I
will be adding signal accuracy and information asymmetry to show the contribution of each
ingredient to the model's behaviour.
For this purpose, I solve the model numerically. The exercise is done in order to show
the qualitative behaviour of the model, therefore the economy have not been parametrized
for any particular country. The parameters of the model used for the analysis are displayed
in Table 2.1. The endowment in good state is normalized to 1. The endowment in bad state
is set to 0.4 and the output in the first period is the mean of endowments received in good
and bad states. The discount factor is β = 0.96 and the risk free rate is set to be equal
to 1/β = 1 + r. Cost of default, ydef and δ are 0.5 and 2.5. Output in autarky is chosen
so that it is lower than average expected endowment, but higher than the endowment in
bad state. Alternative values for default cost will change the result quantitatively, but will
not alter the mechanism. Higher value of default cost will shift the level of initial debt for
which government will default, but will not affect considerably the general shape of debt
policy function. To complete the parametrization, I assume that probability of receiving low
endowment is equal to λ = 0.3. Later I provide results for a different parametrization of λ
to check for the robustness of the results.
Figure 1.1 plots the equilibrium asset holdings given the initial level of debt in the case
when signals are not informative for both parties, ψ = 0.5. Given the state variables,
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Parameter Notation Value
Discount factor β 0.96
Risk free interest rate r 0.04
High level of endowment yh 1
Low level of endowment yl 0.4
Initial output y1 0.7
Output in autarky ydef 0.5
Default penalty δ 2.5
Prob of low state λ 0.3
Table 1.1: Calibration
government can end up choosing the level of debt in one of the 4 regions.
The first region depicts the behaviour of an unconstrained country that has a small level
of debt and still has plenty of room to sell the sovereign bonds at a risk free rate. The
second region is characteristic to the countries that have reached the maximum level of debt,
bL that guarantees the zero risk. The third region describes the behaviour of the countries
that already encounter some risk of paying back the debt, but have not over-borrowed yet.
In this case the government will repay its obligations when it has a good state, but will
default if the nature draws a bad state. The last region shows the countries that are not
able to roll over the outstanding debt any more and default.
For a different parametrization of the model, it may exist another region that could be
placed between the third and forth regions. In this case, the government keeps the maximum
level of debt that can be repaid by the government in the good state, bH . Any additional
borrowed penny can push the country into default. It pays a high interest rate, but still is able
to roll over the debt. In the world of Conesa and Kehoe (2012), these are the governments
that are gambling for redemption. They borrow high level of debt expecting that tomorrow
times will get better.
The depicted regions can be larger or smaller depending on the parameters. Further I
look at how changes in the signal or its precision affect the optimal government decision.
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CHAPTER 1. Sovereign debt and asymmetric market information: Mechanism
case information has been studied in Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013).
1.1.6 Asymmetric information
The aim of this section is to show how government's optimal decision changes when agents
hold asymmetric information and precisely when government receives more informative signal
than lenders do. Can it be the case that government can take advantage of lenders' lack of
precision of information and contract higher amount of debt?
Figure 1.3 describes the main intuition behind the asymmetric information case. It
shows the results when government receives more informative signal than lenders. Precisely
it depicts the cases when lenders observe more accurate signal regarding future endowment
realization, given that government's precision and signal stays the same. I assume that
government receives a good signal with precision, ψ = 0.7. The signal that government
receives does not affect the qualitative results. The solid line presents the case when foreign
lenders receive a noisy signal. Since the information is totally opaque, the price set by lenders
for a given amount of initial assets is the same when lenders observe low or high signals.
Once the precision of received signal increases, the amount of optimal borrowing changes
depending on whether the signal is high or low.
When lenders receive a signal that tomorrow's endowment will be high, the expected
country's probability of default perceived by them goes down. As a result, lenders offer a
higher price for the same amount of bonds and government, on average, demands more debt
(depicted by the dashed line in figure 1.3a). The latter chooses a higher level of debt in the
regions where it is constrained by the resource equation. Hence, the region two described
above will shorten, as the debt level will jump to a higher level given the same amount of
initial assets. Similarly, the optimal debt will be higher in the region that neighbors the
one of default decision. When the price of asset increase, government is able to roll-over the
debt for higher levels of initial assets. The only region that stays unchanged is one where
government is not resource constrained.
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CHAPTER 1. Sovereign debt and asymmetric market information: Mechanism
precise information, forecasts become more accurate and debt management more efficient.
Higher probability of being tomorrow in a good state results in a monotonic increase in the
level of debt as a function of government signal precision. However, when the likelihood of
being in a good state decreases, government's optimal level of debt increases up to a point,
after which it goes down. This kink is observed for high current level of debt. Driven by
the consumption smoothing behavior government increases its level of debt with precision.
However, as soon as it observes more accurate information and expects the low endowment
tomorrow with higher probability, it starts demanding less debt.
The limiting case discussed in Arellano (2008) is given by the point when both government
and lenders can not extract any information from the signal about the future endowment.
For a given level of debt, this point is depicted in Fig. 1.6a at the beginning of the grid scale.
Increase in the asymmetry of signal precision increases the level of debt, the fact that this
strand of literature find it hard to match.
In the second case, government is assumed to have a highly precise signal about the
future endowment. Figure 1.6b plots the optimal level of debt as a function of lenders' signal
precision. It shows that the assets that are contracted are higher when good times are more
likely to come tomorrow. Similar to the previous case the government can contract a higher
debt if lender's signals about future endowment are relatively more accurate. The price
of debt decreases when the lender is less opaque and the probability of having good times
tomorrow is higher. Government contracts more debt at a lower cost. This gives a positive
relationship between precision and the level of debt. This result is different when bad times
are more likely to come tomorrow. The debt increases slightly when accuracy of lender's
signal increases. This is due to the fact that there is still small probability that government
gets a high signal. It increases the prices of sold bonds and respectively the optimal debt.
But it will start decreasing onwards for higher precision of the signal. This result is intuitive.
When the accuracy increases, receiving the high signal is less likely. This fact increases
the probability of default tomorrow as perceived by lenders and they offer a lower price.
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This in turn decreases the demand of sold bonds. Therefore, when government faces bad
times it is willing to be less transparent in order to take advantage of contracting higher
debt. This fact has been noticed in recent debt crisis (2009-2011). If full information has
been immediately available to investors, markets would arbitrage it away, avoiding such large
accumulation of unsustainable debt.2
1.2 Conclusion
Asymmetry in information plays an important role in optimal government's behaviour. Even
when government and lenders receive a similar accuracy signals, government contracts more
debt when received information is not shared with lenders. When government observes
more accurate information the optimal debt level increases even further. There are two
effects taking place. As likelihood of being tomorrow in good times increases, government
contracts on average higher level of debt despite relatively high cost, due to consumption
smoothing behaviour. If the probability of receiving a low endowment tomorrow is higher,
then government takes advantage of relatively low cost offered by uninformed lenders and as
a result borrows more.
Furthermore, for high level of outstanding debt government can borrow higher amounts
when lender's precision is slightly higher. This is in line with the observed fact that developed
countries can sustain a higher level of debt than emerging economies that are known to
provide less qualitative information.
2Greek government revised twice its budget deficit for 2008 during one year, first from a number of under
10% to 12.9% and then added up 1% of GDP more to its official number.
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Chapter 2
Sovereign debt and asymmetric market
information: Infinite Horizon
2.1 Infinite horizon model
In this chapter, I extend the above studied two-period model to show the behavior of asym-
metric information in a model calibrated for a real economy. I build an infinite horizon
model of endogenous sovereign default where information between government and lenders
is asymmetric.
2.1.1 Environment
We consider an environment of a small open economy. Time is discrete and the economy
lasts indefinitely, t = 0, 1,.. . The economy is inhabited by a representative household and a
government. Outside the economy there is a large set of competitive risk neutral lenders.
Time-line. At the beginning of every period t,
1. Government (g) inherits a debt level bt, observes output yt and receives a private signal
regarding future endowment sgt .
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2. Foreign lenders (f) observe the government's current level of debt, current endow-
ment received by the government and their own signal regarding government's future
output,sft . The latter is incorporated in the asset price function.
3. Government decides whether to default or not.
4. If the government defaults, it is not allowed to participate in the credit market and
incurs a cost in the form of foregone endowment by consuming ydef . It re-enters the
credit market with a probability ω.
5. If the government does not default, it observes lenders' signal through the offered price
and decides upon the level of debt bt+1.
I assume agents have an asymmetric information structure, which is described below.
Assumption about government. Government observes its own signal and infers lenders'
signal when it participates in the credit market.
Assumption about lenders. Lenders observe their own signal, but can not observe gov-
ernment's signal and neither update their signal after observing the debt contracted by the
government. If lenders could back out the government's signal, the model would collapse to
a symmetric information case. One alternative way of microfounding the model is to allow
lenders extract the government's signal from its demanded level of debt. This approaches
complicates considerably the setting, so we prefer to go with the simple ad-hoc approach to
understand the effects of asymmetric information.
The assumption that government has better information is based on the fact that often
official data is little reliable and government hides the weaknesses in financial systems as it
is documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Romer and Romer (2000) also argue that
indeed government may posses information about the state of economy that is not known
by the public due to vast resources that it devotes to forecasting.
In what follows, we describe the signal shocks and the joint dynamics of the endowment
and the signals.
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2.1.2 Signal specification
As in Arellano (2008), endowment follows an AR(1) log normal process with εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
log(yt) = ρ log(yt−1) + εt, |ρ| < 1 (2.1)
The process is approximated by Markov chain with probabilities Pr(yt+1 = m|yt = j) ∀m, j ∈
Y . Every period the government and the lenders receive a signal, si, ∀i = {f, g}, regarding
next period's endowment. Signal's set S i for both parties has the same size and we consider
that |Y| = |Sg| = |Sf |. The superscripts g and f stand for government's and foreign lenders'
signal set. It is important to underline that signals which government and lenders receive
are not necessarily the same and they are independently distributed.
We interpret precision as the ability of the received signal to predict the future output. Or,
in more formal way, precision is the probability of receiving a signal regarding a particular
endowment conditional on receiving it in the future. If the received signal regarding a
particular output is inaccurate (i.e. signal is not precise) then, the probability of receiving
the latter is similar to the case when the agent receives no signal. When the signal is more
precise the probability of receiving this particular output increases. Given the precision of
the signals for the government and the lenders, we can specify the joint process of the signals
and the endowment shock. The forecast conditional on current information is given by Bayes
theorem.
Pr(yt+1 = k|yt = n, sgt = m) =
Pr(sgt = m|yt+1 = k) Pr(yt+1 = k|yt = n)∑
j Pr(s
g
t = m|yt+1 = j) Pr(yt+1 = j|yt = n)
; (2.2)
Joint distribution of the signals and endowment used in the simulation is given by
Π(y′, sg′, sf ′|y, sg). The derivation and the explicit formula is given in the appendix.
For simplicity we assume a symmetric signal precision that is given by:
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Pr(sgt = i|yt+1 = j) =
 ψ
g, i = j,
1−ψg
|Sg |−1 , otw.
If the precision of the signal is high, i.e. ψg → 1, then the signal perfectly predicts the
output realization tomorrow, i.e. Pr(yt+1 = j|sgt = i)→ 1, for i = j. If the precision is low,
the signal gives no additional information and Pr(yt+1 = j|sgt = i) = Pr(yt+1 = j).
A similar symmetric structure is assumed for the lenders' signal.
2.1.3 Environment
Preferences. The government's goal is to maximize the utility of the representative household.
The household's preferences are given by the expected utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct),
where u(ct) is strictly increasing, concave and continuously differentiable. The discount factor
is β ∈ (0, 1). For simulated economy we use a CRRA utility function. Given the current
endowment, yt, outstanding assets, bt, private signal, s
g
t and the bond price, qt, government
decides every period whether to default or to repay the current debt. If it repays it decides
upon the new level of debt.
Government's problem can be written in a recursive way. Given the state variables, the
value function is given by:
V0(b, y, s
g, sf ) = max{V ND(b, y, sg, sf ), V D(y, sg)},
where V ND(b, y, sg, sf ) is the value if government continues the repayment and V D(y, sg) is
the value if government defaults.
When government decides to default, it temporarily exits the international credit market.
Being in autarky, government can regain the possibility to lend\borrow in the credit market
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with probability ω. Government re-enters the credit market with zero debt.
The value function in case of default is given by:
V D(y, sg) = u(ydef ) + β
∑
y′,sg′,sf ′
[
(1− ω)V D(y′, sg′) + ωV0(0, y′, sg′, sf ′)
]
Π(y′, sg′, sf ′|y, sg).
Besides the temporal autarky, default imposes additional cost in the form of lost output that
is given by:
ydef = min
{
y, φE(y)
}
, (2.3)
where φ < 1. This assumption follows exactly Arellano (2008). Mendoza and Yue (2012)
develop a theoretical model that explains the rising cost of default with higher output. Also
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) document that the cost of default is an increasing function of
endowment.
If government decides to repay the debt, its value function is the following:
V ND(b, y, sg, sf ) = max
b′
{
u
(
y+b−q(b′, y, sf )b′
)
+β
∑
y′,sg′,sf ′
V0(b
′, y′, sg′, sf ′)Π(y′, sg′, sf ′|y, sg)
}
.
(2.4)
The government maximizes the utility by choosing an optimal level of debt, b′. The
resource constraint is given by the sum of endowment and net borrowing. The debt is
bounded below, b ≥ −Z to prevent Ponzi schemes, but does not bind in equilibrium.
For a given level of debt, the default set of the government includes the collection of
possible endowments, lenders' and government's signals for which the value of default is
greater than the value of repayment. Precisely, the default set is given by:
D(b) = {(y, sg, sf ) ∈ Y × Sg × Sf : V ND(b, y, sg, sf ) < V D(y, sg)}. (2.5)
The expected probability of default for a given level of debt is then the weighted sum of
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default events:
δ(b′, y, sg, sf ) =
∑
y′,sg′,sf ′∈D(b′)
Π(y′, sg′, sf ′|y, sg).
Lenders receive their own signal and do not observe the signal received by the government.
Lenders are risk neutral, act competitively and maximize their profits. They buy today the
bond at a price q and expect to receive tomorrow its face value with the probability, δft , that
government does not default.
pi = −qtbt+1 + δ
f
t (bt+1, s
f
t , yt)
1 + r
0 +
(1− δft (bt+1, sft , yt))
1 + r
bt+1,
where δft (bt+1, s
f
t , yt) is the probability of sovereign default as believed by the lender. Since
lenders do not observe the government's signal and do not extract information from govern-
ment's choice of the new level of debt, the expected probability of default for a given level
of debt perceived by them can differ from the one expected by the government.
The lender computes the government's probability of default given its signal, that is given
by:
δft (bt+1, s
f
t , yt) = E
[
1
{
(V ND(b, y, sg, sf ) < V D(y, sg)|sf )
}]
. (2.6)
Since the market is competitive and the lenders satisfy the zero profit condition, the price
function is given by:
q(bt+1, s
f
t , yt) =
(1− δft (bt+1, sft , yt))
1 + r
.
2.2 Quantitative analysis
This section aims at analysing the behaviour of the debt level along several dimensions. The
main ingredients are the signals accuracies and the optimal level of future bond holdings.
The idea is to compare the outcome of the model of endogenous default, developed by Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) with the model that includes signal precision described in the previous
section.
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The basic mechanism of the model has been thoroughly discussed in 1.1. Herein, I show
how the model behaves for a simulated real economy. I calibrate the model for Argentina,
so that I can compare the results across several papers (Arellano (2008), Durdu, Nunes, and
Sapriza (2013)).
2.2.1 Parameterization
Our baseline model is calibrated exactly as the one presented in Arellano (2008).
Table 2.1: Calibration
Parameter Notation Value
Discount factor β 0.953
Risk free interest rate r 0.017
Stochastic structure, AR(1) coef. ρ 0.945
Risk aversion σ 2
Cost of output during default φ 0.969
Reentry in the credit market ω 0.282
Signal precision ψg, ψf
[
1
|S| , 0.9
]
The limiting case when both government and lenders receive a noisy signal (i.e. ψg =
ψf = 1/S) represents the benchmark model.
The utility function takes the CRRA form:
u(c) =
c(1−σ)
1− σ .
Our goal is to show the behavior of the government when it has more accurate information
about the future endowment. More precisely we want to show the effects of increasing
transparency1 and information accuracy on the level of contracted assets and the default
risk.
We set the risk aversion parameter, σ = 2, value extensively used in the literature. Default
1Higher transparency is equivalent to lower discrepancy in government's and lenders' signals precisions.
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Table 2.2: Business Cycle Moments in the data
Emerging Markets Developed Economies
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.45 0.94
ρ(y, c) 0.72 0.66
ρ(y, nx/y) −0.51 −0.17
ρ(y, spread) −0.55 0.20
Source: Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013)
penalty, φ = 0.969, is set to generate output loss in Argentina as estimated in Arellano (2008).
Discount factor, β = 0.953, is set to receive 3% probability of default, equal to 3 historical
defaults in the last 100 years. Risk free interest rate, r = 1.7% is estimated from US series
of 5 year quarterly yield of treasury bonds. Probability of re-entering the credit market after
being in autarky is set according to estimates in Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2004).
In order to simulate a small open economy we discretized the bond grid in 100 equidistant
points. The stochastic process of output is assumed to be log-normal AR(1) process described
in section 2.1.2. The autocorrelation and standard deviation of output are set to match the
moments of Argentina's GDP estimated in Arellano (2008), ρ = 0.945 and σε = 0.025. The
output shock is discretized in 21-state Markov chain points. Since the set of signals and the
set of output shocks have the same size signal sets are also discretized in 21 points for each
party. The statistics reported in table 2.3 are averages of 200 samples of 74 observations
before default2. The simulated series are logged and filtered with a linear trend.
Table 2.3 presents the business cycle statistics for 3 cases: when both government and
lenders receive noisy signal, when they receive a very accurate signal and when government
observes a very precise signal, while lenders receive a noisy one. Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza
(2013) associate the first two cases respectively with the emerging markets and the developed
economies.
It is important to notice that the business cycle moments, for the case when lenders
2The number 74 is chosen to have the same number of periods between defaults in Argentina (Q3.1983-
Q4.2001)
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observe worse quality information than government about latter's fundamentals, are much
closer to the values observed in the data for emerging markets, presented in table 2.2. Hence,
transparency and asymmetry of information between lenders and governments may play an
important role in explaining the differences between these two camps.
Table 2.3: Business Cycle Statistics
ψf = 1/S ψf = 0.9 ψf = 1/S
ψg = 1/S ψg = 0.9 ψg = 0.9
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.11 1.03 1.23
ρ(y, c) 0.97 0.86 0.84
ρ(y, nx/y) −0.26 0.17 −0.16
ρ(y, spread) −0.23 −0.14 −0.39
2.2.2 Simulation Results
Figure 2.1 plots the optimal level of assets holdings as a function of current debt(savings)
for different levels of signals accuracy. The future period asset holdings are weighted by the
long run probabilities of output and signal shocks, which causes the non-monotonicity of the
policy function.
Figure 2.1a shows the case when lenders have a noisy signal. It depicts the borrowing
policy function for 2 values of government's signal precision. When government has more
information than lenders about future output, it contracts on average higher amount of
debt. Government is less uncertain about the future output and, therefore, its demand for
precautionary savings decreases. This drives the downward shift of the debt policy function.
In figure 2.1b, I plot the changes in the asset policy function when transparency decreases
and lenders catch up to the government's signal precision. I compare the 2 cases, when the
lenders receive a noisy signal with the one where it observe a more informative signal. I
assume that, in both cases, government receives a highly accurate signal. Increasing trans-
parency shifts the asset policy function up, therefore, government borrows less for the same
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amount of current debt. As it was discussed in section 1.1, government demands on average
more debt when it observes a different signal from lenders. But, when the lenders' signal
accuracy increases, the probability of receiving the same signal as government rises also.
Therefore, optimal debt level goes down. However, the changes in government's demand for
borrowing are relatively smaller for the lower level of initial debt in comparison to the case
when it is highly indebted.
When government is less constrained, it has to rollover smaller amounts of debt and
therefore changes in price affect less the changes in the demanded debt. However, when
government is highly indebted and requires higher amounts of debt, it reacts much stronger to
smaller changes in prices. The mechanism has been studied for a two period model in section
1.1. The idea is that whenever government observes a different signal from lenders',the former
takes advantage of uninformative lenders and borrows more where it needs it the most, or in
risky zones. Therefore, the relative change in optimal amount of debt when lenders receive
a more accurate signal differs for low and higher amounts of government's current asset
holdings.
In addition, the two figures in 2.1 show that less uncertainty regarding future endowment
decreases the borrowing cost, therefore government can afford a higher level of debt. This
is consistent with the empirical observation that more developed economies with better
information system are able to borrow higher amounts of debt and has been studied by
Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013).
In case when the government has a high level of debt and both government and lenders
know better the future state, government can not take advantage of uninformed lender and
defaults more often in comparison to the case of uninformed lenders. When lenders are less
certain about future outcome they offer a better price in bad times than better informed
lenders. Therefore the government can sustain a higher level of debt and default less often
which on average drives the borrowing level up.
The figure 2.2 illustrates the changes in shape and surface of default region due to changes
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Figure 2.2: Default space and level of precision
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(a) ψg = 1/S and ψf = 1/S
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(b) ψg = 0.5 and ψf = 0.1
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(c) ψg = 0.1 and ψf = 0.5
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(d) ψg = 0.5 and ψf = 0.5
Notes: The graphs show the default state for different levels of agents' signals accuracy as a function of
current bond holdings and lenders' signal. Endowment is in steady state and government receives a signal
that output is in steady state.
Once the signal becomes more informative, the shape of default region changes. In figure
2.2b both, the information precision for the government rises, with a relatively lower increase
in the signal's accuracy for lenders. This implies that the price function changes slightly.
When the lenders receive a signal that output tomorrow will increase it offers a better price,
the opposite happens when it observes a lower output signal. Hence government defaults
having higher level of debt when lenders have positive expectations, and vice-versa when
it has negative ones. It is reflected in the S" shape of the default region. It is important
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to notice that the signals that predict level of endowment considerably different from the
current one do not impact the default decision. This is due to the fact that output follows
a Markov process, therefore given that some yt is realized, some values of future output are
unlikely to realize and are discounted appropriately.
Government's signal regarding future output does not change, but changes its predictabil-
ity power. In addition, government can extract lenders' signal when participates in the
market. More precise is the information that government receives, more pronounced is the
curvature of default region contour. This is easier to notice by comparing the figures 2.2c
and 2.2d.
The lower panel shows the changes in the default region when lenders receive a more
informative signal. In figure 2.2c, the lenders observe a relatively more precise signal than
government. Since government has less accurate information, it demands higher precaution-
ary savings and therefore the contour of default region smooths. In addition, higher lenders'
signal accuracy shifts the default regions slightly rightwards. Hence, when lenders observe
more accurate information, government defaults having a lower level of debt in comparison
to the case when lenders' signal is noisy.
When lenders receive a more precise signal, the changes in government's default behavior
is more pronounced if lenders receive a signal that output tomorrow will decrease. Given
that the signal and government's information precision does not change, it will postpone the
default as long as it can. As a consequence, the changes in lenders' price when they receive
good news will not alter government's decision much. However, when lenders receive accurate
bad news, the slightest change in the price affects considerably government's decision to
default. Government can not afford paying a higher cost and defaults having lower current
debt. The asymmetric response to lenders' signal precision will affect the final result. More
accurate lenders' signal, on average, makes government default having lower debt. As a
result, the sustained debt in equilibrium will also be smaller.
Having higher transparency leads to following conclusion. If lenders have accurate in-
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Table 2.4: Debt and Probability of Default Statistics
ψf = 1/S ψf = 1/S ψf = 1/S ψf = 0.5 ψf = 0.9
ψg = 1/S ψg = 0.5 ψg = 0.9 ψg = 0.9 ψg = 0.9
Mean debt (% of output) 6.1 13.7 16.6 11.7 8.2
Probability of default (%) 3 17.1 20.1 11.5 2.5
formation government is able to borrow higher levels of debt for a given level of current
liabilities. The same time the default region on average expands with higher signal precision
and does not allow borrowing higher amounts of debt.
2.2.3 Signal precision and debt level
In the previous section we analyzed the behavior of the policy functions as a result of an
increase in the government's and lenders' signal accuracy. Herein, we show the quantitative
performance of the model when introducing information asymmetry. Precisely, we simulate
the economy for different levels of precision for the government and lenders and plot the debt
level and default as a function of these two.
Table 2.4 displays the results for the probability of default and the average level of debt
as a percentage of output for different levels of government's and lenders' signal precision.
As government's information becomes more precise, its level of debt to output ratio increases
by more than twice. This increases substantially the default rate. However, as soon as the
difference in signal's precision between government and lenders shrinks, the level of debt to
output ratio goes down. Hence, the model can generate a higher level of debt and a higher
probability of default, moments that are still challenging to retrieve in this class of models.
The upper panel of figure 2.3 depicts the average debt to output ratio and the maximum
debt to output ratio during period that does not include a default as a function of lender's
signal precision, φf . The lower panel shows the associated probability of default. Every
graph in figure 2.3 shows the behavior for a given level of government's signal accuracy, φg.
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The minimum contracted debt is attained when both government and lenders have the same
level of precision, that is when there is no asymmetry in information. Once the signal's
precision diverges, government ends up having a higher debt to GDP ratio.
It is important to note that when both parties are better informed about the future
output and there is no asymmetry in information, government contracts higher amount of
debt. This fact is in line with the observation that more developed countries with better
information systems are able to effectively manage the debt and sustain a higher level of
debt to GDP ratio.
However, when asymmetry of information is present and one of the parties has better
information regarding future output than the other, the debt level soars up. When the
government is less uncertain about the future output it can more effectively manage its flows
and demands less precautionary savings. As a result, it borrows more. Signal accuracy
plays and especially important role when government has high level of debt. If government
has little borrowings, the changes in asset prices do not alter the average level of debt. It
can contract a lower level of debt, but it will not default as the cost of default is higher.
However, when government is on the edge of defaulting the price affects a lot the amount of
debt. If lenders receive a good signal, government is able to sustain the high level of debt.
But, if lenders receive a bad signal, the cost of borrowing goes up and government defaults.
In addition, given the government's signal, lenders' bad signal causes much more variation
in default region when the precision increases in comparison to the good signal. This is
reflected in the optimal default behavior in figures 2.2b and 2.2d.
Therefore, when lenders observe a noisy bad signal the cost of borrowing is lower in
comparison to the case when they receive a precise bad signal. Government takes advantage
of lower cost and contracts more when lenders are less informed. Since this overweights the
effects of lenders receiving an informed good signal, government ends up borrowing more
when lenders have a less precise information regarding future output.
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CHAPTER 2. Sovereign debt and asymmetric market information: Infinite Horizon
2.3 Conclusion
Recent crisis showed that transparency and asymmetry in information are characteristic not
only to emerging markets. In order to explore why governments are not opening their books
and enjoy the lower interest rates, we construct a model of endogenous sovereign default
where government and lenders receive different quality of information about future funda-
mentals. In our framework, lenders and government receive signals that contain information
regarding future output and affect the asset price and the ultimate level of debt and default.
The quantitative results show that when government has more precise information re-
garding future fundamentals than lenders, it holds on average higher levels of debt. Precisely,
if government's signal is fully informative and lenders' is not, it contracts triple to what it
does in a symmetric non-informative case. This is a result of the fact that government's
benefits from being transparent when news are good than costs when they are bad.
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.1 Empirical Evidence
Figure 4: RMSE of GDP per capita growth rate and GDP per capita (logs)
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.2 RMSE data
Table 5: RMSE for high (1) and low (3) income countries
income group country Mean RMSE
1 BDI .0580491
1 BEN .0306461
1 BGD .0406941
1 BTN .043358
1 CIV .0485088
1 CMR .0549011
1 ETH .0667862
1 GHA .0409194
1 GIN .0141529
1 GMB .0339201
1 IND .03194
1 KEN .0453614
1 KGZ .0656688
1 LSO .0538296
1 MDA .0982793
1 MNG .0306838
1 MRT .0597908
1 MWI .0525543
1 NAM .0314214
1 NGA .080203
1 NIC .0647323
1 NPL .0258773
1 PAK .0223099
1 PNG .0406445
1 RWA .1136188
1 SDN .0518931
1 SEN .0357423
1 SLB .055529
1 SLE .0560663
1 TCD .0832142
1 TJK .0902591
1 UGA .0271526
1 YEM .0099188
1 ZAR .0584319
1 ZMB .0458734
1 ZWE .0567703
Total .0505473
income group country Mean RMSE
3 AUS .0176155
3 AUT .016329
3 BEL .0175984
3 CAN .0187354
3 CHE .014087
3 DEU .0148434
3 DNK .0204088
3 ESP .0195385
3 FIN .0223607
3 FRA .0144907
3 GBR .0161528
3 GRC .0331447
3 ISL .0322819
3 ITA .0203318
3 JPN .0285742
3 LUX .0308592
3 MLT .0304221
3 NLD .0179926
3 NOR .014582
3 NZL .0209088
3 PRT .0323398
3 SWE .0164335
3 USA .0181273
Mean .02122
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Table 6: RMSE for middle income countries
income group country Mean RMSE
2 ALB .0890506
2 ARE .0741588
2 ARG .0561755
2 BGR .0406419
2 BHR .0436759
2 BHS .063633
2 BLR .0474818
2 BLZ .0353564
2 BOL .0341891
2 BRA .0340571
2 BRB .0406246
2 BWA .0346334
2 CHL .045179
2 CHN .0713379
2 COL .0196984
2 CPV .0391409
2 CRI .030532
2 CYP .0382916
2 CZE .0439801
2 DJI .0260774
2 DZA .0766946
2 ECU .0277729
2 EGY .02403
2 FJI .0454387
2 GAB .0935701
2 GEO .0883974
2 GRD .04227
2 GTM .0194259
2 GUY .0499468
2 HND .0283159
2 HUN .0537934
2 IDN .0369673
2 ISR .0323486
2 JOR .056908
2 KAZ .0484273
2 KOR .0336559
continue..
incgroup country Mean RMSE
2 LBN .1705097
2 LCA .069006
2 LKA .0172959
2 LTU .0677144
2 LVA .0659089
2 MAR .0405525
2 MEX .031046
2 MUS .0354314
2 MYS .032461
2 OMN .1012077
2 PAN .038818
2 PER .0460667
2 PHL .025225
2 POL .035466
2 PRY .0262226
2 RUS .0503158
2 SAU .0583384
2 SGP .0367886
2 SLV .0248622
2 SUR .0530784
2 SVK .0395866
2 SVN .0347823
2 SWZ .0433942
2 SYC .0502852
2 THA .0330636
2 TON .0259387
2 TTO .0391712
2 TUN .0335144
2 TUR .0370637
2 UKR .0569041
2 URY .0371054
2 VCT .061619
2 VEN .0515477
2 VUT .0507817
2 WSM .0305096
2 ZAF .0218793
Mean .04637
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.3 Joint distribution of endowment and signal shocks
Below I provide the expression for Markov chain for the joint evolution of the endowment
shock and the signals. The government's information set at time t is Ω = {y1, sg1, sf1 , y2, ..., sft }.
Probability of receiving signals sgt+1 and s
f
t+1 are conditionally independent given the infor-
mation at time t, Pr(sgt+1|Ωt) ⊥ Pr(sft+1|Ωt).
p(sgt+1 = i, s
`
t+1 = j, yt+1 = k|sgt = m, yt = n) =
p(sgt+1 = i, s
`
t+1 = j, yt+1 = k, s
g
t = m, yt = n)
p(sgt = m, yt = n)
=
=
p(sgt+1 = i, s
`
t+1 = j|yt+1 = k, yt = n, sgt = m)p(yt+1 = k|yt = n, sgt = m)p(yt = n, sgt = m)
p(yt = n, s
g
t = m)
=
= p(sgt+1 = i, s
`
t+1 = j|yt+1 = k, yt = n, sgt = m)p(yt+1 = k|yt = n, sgt = m);
p(sgt+1 = i, s
`
t+1 = j|yt+1 = k, yt = n, sgt = m) =
= p(sgt+1 = i|yt+1 = k, yt = n, sgt = m)p(s`t+1 = j|yt+1 = k, yt = n, sgt = m) =
= p(sgt+1 = i|yt+1 = k)p(s`t+1 = j|yt+1 = k);
p(yt+1 = k|yt = n, sgt = m) =
p(yt+1 = k, yt = n, s
g
t = m)
p(yt = n, s
g
t = m)
=
=
p(sgt = m|yt+1 = k, yt = n)p(yt+1 = k|yt = n)p(yt = n)
p(sgt = m|yt = n)p(yt = n)
=
=
p(sgt = m|yt+1 = k)p(yt+1 = k|yt = n)∑
f p(s
g
t = m|yt+1 = f)p(yt+1 = f |yt = n)
;
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p(sgt+1 = i, s
`
t+1 = j, yt+1 = k|sgt = m, yt = n) =
=
∑
f
p(sgt+1 = i|yt+2 = f)p(yt+2 = f |yt+1 = k)
∑
r
p(s`t+1 = j|yt+2 = r)p(yt+2 = r|yt+1 = k)×
× p(yt+1 = k|yt = n, sgt = m).
i,m ∈ SG, j ∈ S` and k, n, f, r ∈ Y
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Chapter 3
Optimal Government Transparency
3.1 Introduction
Government transparency is an important characteristic in guaranteeing fiscal discipline and
reducing economic uncertainty. Over the last few decades, it has received a lot of attention
both from academic and non-academic literature. In 2001, the IMF published the Manual
on Fiscal Transparency and developed codes of good practices that guide governments into
being more transparent, accountable and deliver reports that would be understood by general
public.1
There is a significant body of literature showing the negative effects of a lack of trans-
parency. Among others, Gelos and Wei (2005) provide evidence that less transparent coun-
tries receive less investment and that during crisis they are more likely to experience high
capital outflows.2 Marques, Gelos, and Melgar (2013) document that more opaque countries
suffer more from financial globalization. Several economic crisis have been partially worsened
by lack of transparency. For instance, in the recent Asian crisis, the Thai government has
been accused of allowing an extremely opaque financial sector to flourish. It is considered to
1Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes designed by IMF (World Bank) is just one of many
other reports that are performed at request by a country that assesses government's transparency.
2See Gande and Parsley (2014), Bernoth and Wolff (2008), Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), Alt, Lassen, and
Rose (2006), etc, for different aspects of economy that can be affected by lack of transparency.
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be one of the key elements that triggered the financial turmoil in 1997. A decade later, in
one of the worst recessions since Great Depression, hidden debts of Greek government added
more panic to already vulnerable sovereign bond markets in 2009-2010.
Even though various evidence suggests that government opaqueness has negative effects,
in practice there are economies that still choose to have less accountable and less transparent
finances. A recent policy paper by the IMF3 estimated that 23% of the unexpected increase
in general government debt was due to incomplete information about the government's un-
derlying fiscal position. In the present chapter, I want to emphasize some of the economic
conditions when governments choose to be less transparent. In particular, I focus on such
macroeconomic aspects as level of debt, probability of expected recession and severeness of
the expected economic downturn.
I develop a dynamic model of endogenous sovereign default with private information. I
build a small open economy that lasts for three periods and is inhabited by a representative
household, a government, that can borrow in an external credit market, and a continuum of
foreign risk neutral lenders. At the beginning of the first period, nature draws the state in
which the economy will be in the next few periods. This information is privately observed by
the government. Before observing its future state, government decides whether to credibly
disclose it to the general public or not. Government smooths its consumption by borrowing
one-period debt in the credit market. The market is not perfect due to government's private
information and contingent debt servicing. Therefore, the borrowing cost bears a risk that
the latter may default on the contracted debt. The probability of government being in a
good state and repaying its outstanding debt is updated through Bayes rule, based on the
repayment and borrowing level decisions.
The government that expects a good state is better off if lenders know its type and offer
a higher bond price. The government that expects a bad state would like to mimic former's
behavior so that it can contract higher levels of debt than would otherwise be affordable.
3approved by Cottarelli (2012)
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Since the commitment regarding disclosure of government's future state is made before it is
drawn, the government faces a trade-off: greater transparency increases the benefits in good
times, but leaves it without additional funds when it needs them the most. Therefore, one
would expect that lack of transparency is especially tempting when probability of the crisis
is higher.
In present paper, contrary to this intuition, I show that government actually prefers to
be less transparent when it is more likely to have better times; and commits to disclose fully
its state when it expects more likely to have bad times.
If the probability of an upcoming crisis is very high, uninformed lenders increase the costs
of borrowing. As a result, the optimal amount of debt under no transparency is close to the
one that government in a crisis can borrow even if it reveals its state. Therefore, government
prefers to be fully transparent and enjoy higher consumption if it ends up in a good state
during high probability of a crisis.
If a recession is less likely, government is better off by being less transparent. When
probability of a bad state is lower, the price offered by foreign lenders increases and the
amount of debt that a non-transparent government can borrow is higher. As a result, the
loss in welfare if the government is in good times almost vanishes, while the gains if it is in
bad times increases. However, the lower the level of initial indebtedness, less will government
prefer to be opaque. Less financially constrained government incurs lower gains by mimicking
the behavior of a booming economy. Moreover, since the likelihood of experiencing a recession
is also low, the expected welfare of the government before observing its future state is higher
if it is fully transparent.
The results resemble the recent episode of Greek sovereign debt default. During late
90's, Greece was preparing for the access to Eurozone, criteria for which was having a higher
transparency and meeting a series of other economic indicators as budget deficit, level of
debt, etc. In June 2000, its candidacy was accepted by the EU parliament and in 2001 it
was already enjoying its new membership in Eurozone. The high confidence among investors
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granted to a new member that just met the Euro area access criteria opened the doors to
cheap funds. The economies were booming in Greece and around the world. Even the 2004
Eurostat report, saying that statistics for the budget deficit have been underreported, was
not taken much into consideration by lenders that continued lending at low cost. Greece
debt was growing and possibility of rolling it over without hiding its deficit and level of
debt was less straightforward. The lower probability of an upcoming crisis and high level of
debt pushed the Greek government into continuing its less transparent policies. However,
the turmoil in financial market that followed in 2008 questioned the transparency of Greek's
finance and hence its solvency. In 2010, extremely high borrowing costs led to a subsequent
default in 2011. At the same time, more transparent Belgium, that also suffered from
relatively high levels of debt and budget deficits as well as political instability, did not face
any major constraints in rolling over its debt during crisis.
This paper builds on models of sovereign endogenous default started by Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981). It is closely related to Sandleris (2008) that studies a model where government
has private information about its fundamentals. He focuses on incentives that makes gov-
ernment repay its non-contingent debt, besides the classical motivations of reputation and
sanctions. Other papers that include asymmetric information in models of sovereign endoge-
nous default are Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) and D'Erasmo (2008). They present infinite
horizon models where government has private information about its type. In their models,
governments differ in their patience level. D'Erasmo (2008) tries to generate a higher amount
of debt that would match the economic data. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) study a model of
adverse selection where government chooses whether to borrow an exogenously given amount
of debt. Also, in their model the impatient government always defaults. Another closely
related stream of literature of asymmetric information, but with a focus on consumer debt is
represented by Chatterjee, Corbae, and Rios-Rull (2008), Yogo, Perez-Reyna, and Ordonez
(2013). They study models of credit markets where borrowers have private information
about their types. Papers are focusing on revelation mechanisms and incentives of borrow-
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ers to signal their type. Present paper contributes to above literature by building a model
of sovereign default where government can choose the level of transparency and study the
economic conditions that determine it.
Another stream of literature that is related to optimal transparency is the probabilistic
voting models studied by Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) and political agency models represented
by Besley and Smart (2007). Their model focuses on voters that do not observe the electoral
promises and the competition among different political parties. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009)
found that transparency on the expenditure side is welfare improving, while on the revenue
side can be counterproductive. Contrary to their model, I study a different aspect of govern-
ment transparency, in particular I build a small open economy and focus on the interaction
between the latter and foreign lenders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I set up the theoretical model in section
3.2. In section 3.3, I define and characterize the equilibrium. Section 3.4 explains the main
results of the paper.
3.2 Model
In this section, I extend the model described in Part I and allow agents to act strategically.
Government receives private information, which lenders can infer from the actions that the
former is taking. I develop a simple setting of a small open economy, where the world's
interest rate is taken as given. The economy is inhabited by a representative household, a
government and a continuum of risk-neutral competitive foreign lenders. The economy lasts
for 3 periods, t = 0, 1 and 2.
3.2.1 Environment
The government starts with an endowment y0 and a signal that nature draws about its future
state of economy. The signal is perfectly informative for the government and it tells whether
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the economy will be in a boom and will receive a stream of high endowment or it will be in
a crisis and will receive a lower endowment. I assume that the economy will permanently
stay in the initially drawn state starting from period t = 1.
Household is maximizing consumption over the 3 periods. Every period, the household
consumes the observed endowment and a transfer received from the government. It is not
allowed to participate in the credit market, therefore the government acts on its behalf and
transfers to it the proceedings.
The capital market is not perfect and government trades one period non-contingent
bonds. The debt is not enforceable, therefore the latter may choose to default. If the
government defaults, it is not allowed to participate in the credit market anymore and bears
an additional cost in the form of lower future utility.
The foreign lenders are willing to buy any amount of bonds as long as the expected
returns equal to the profits received by trading in the outside risk free market. Since the
government may default, the price offered by lenders reflects the likelihood of government's
reneging on its outstanding debt contract.
The future state of economy drawn by nature is known to the government, but is not
observed by lenders. Before observing the state, government commits to either reveal the
information to lenders, full transparency, or keep it privately, null transparency. When
government is fully transparent, lenders do not face any uncertainty and hence the interest
rate does not include any risk premium for default. When government is opaque, lenders can
not distinguish whether the government is in good or bad state, but they know its probability
distribution. As a result, they offer a price that also reflects the expected probability of the
government receiving a low endowment. Unlike in the analysis in the previous chapters,
herein lenders can infer government's received endowment by observing its actions, precisely
the debt level the former contracts and the default/repayment decision it takes.
Timeline: Time period t = 0 starts.
1. Government starts with the endowment y0 and zero initial debt, b0 = 0;
66
CHAPTER 3. Optimal Transparency
2. At the beginning of period, t = 0, government decides the level of transparency;
3. Nature draws the state, crisis (c) or boom (b), in which the economy will be for the
rest of the periods;
4. Government announces the state it will be, if it decided to be transparent;
5. Government chooses the level of debt, b1;
6. Lenders observe the debt and set the price, q1(b1);
7. Government transfers the lump-sum from the market operations to the household;
8. The household consumes.
Time period t = 1 starts.
1. Government receives the endowment yi, ∀i ∈ {c, b}, depending on state the nature
draws;
2. Government decides whether to default or not;
3. Conditional on the previous decisions, it consumes the endowment if it defaults; or, it
may borrow additionally to the endowment, if it repays the current debt;
4. Lenders observe the actions, update theirs beliefs regarding government's state of econ-
omy and revise the price schedule;
5. The household consumes.
Time period t = 2 starts.
1. Government decides whether to repay and enjoy the terminal value V Ndef or default
and bear the additional cost in form of lower terminal value of utility V Def < V Ndef ;
2. The household consumes.
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3.2.2 Household
The representative household maximizes the expected utility:
U = u(c0) + βu(c1) + β
2u(c2),
where ct is the consumption in period t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Utility is
strictly increasing, weakly concave and twice differentiable. For qualitative analysis, utility
has the log functional form, u(c) = log(c). The household consumes the endowment and the
lump-sum transfer it receives from the government.
3.2.3 Government
Government maximizes households' utility. It participates in the foreign credit market to
smooth the consumption over time. It sells one period non-contingent bonds at a price q
and repays next period the face value, b. The debt is non-enforceable and government may
decide to default. The government starts with zero debt and receives the endowment y0
known to lenders. Next period the economy may end up in a boom" and generate y¯ for the
next two periods, or it may be in the crisis" and receive a persistent endowment y, where
0 < y < y¯. Probability of receiving a low endowment is Pr(y) = λ.
The information about the state of the economy is known to the government privately.
Before observing the signal about future states, it decides whether to be fully transparent and
reveal the information to the lenders or keep it privately. Although government can decide
to be non transparent, its state may still be revealed through the actions it takes, specifically
the default decision and the level of debt it demands. Default decision is taken by comparing
the benefits from the two states, default and non default. Defaulting has a cost in the form
of lower future value, V Def , and permanent autarky. The latter is a standard approach
to explain the government's willingness to repay the debt. Sandleris (2008) shows that in a
model with private information it is possible to sustain a positive amount of debt without any
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reputation or direct sanctions from creditors. However, his model features additional agent
that punishes government through lower investment in case of default. Since, the question
of the present paper is not explaining the government's willingness to repay, I abstract from
any additional complexities to my model and allow government to incur direct default costs.
In addition, Mendoza and Yue (2012) show in a theoretical framework that economy suffers
an endogenous cost of output when defaults.
Then, if government decides to repay the debt, the economy's resource constraint in
period t = 0, 1 is:
ct = yt − bt + q(bt+1)bt+1, ∀t = 0, 1,
and, if it defaults:
ct = yt.
It is convenient to write the government's problem starting in the last period, by working
it backward. Let Di,t be the debt level where government is indifferent between defaulting
and not defaulting in period t. The i subscript stands for government being in one of the
two states, crisis" or boom", i ∈ {c, b}. Government will repay the face value of the
withstanding debt if it is lower than Di,t.
In period T=2, government receives the endowment depending on its state. If it borrowed
in the previous period it decides whether to default or not. Government's utility is given by:
Vi,2 =
 log(yi − bi,2) + βV
NDef if bi,2 ≤ Di,2
log(yi) + βV
Def if bi,2 > Di,2.
The terminal utility values V Def and V NDef ensure that government bears a cost of
default. Without any cost, the only sustainable debt level suggested by sovereign debt
literature is b = 0 (see Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005), Bulow and Rogoff (1989)).
At time T=1, the government begins with output yi and with some debt bi,1. Depending
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on its default decision, it may borrow a new level of debt, bi,2. The utility is given by:
Vi,1 =
 log(yi − bi,1 + qi,2(bi,2)bi,2) + βVi,2 if bi,1 ≤ Di,1log(yi) + β(log(yi) + βV Def ) if bi,1 > Di,1,
In period T=0, government takes sequentially two decisions depending on the information
it has at hand. Firstly, government choses whether to be transparent or not, and then it
decides upon the optimal level of debt. I abstract from the trivial case of default in the first
period and assume that government starts with zero debt. Note however, that the initial
endowment y0 can be interpreted as the net output after repaying the outstanding debt. A
lower y0 is equivalent to having a high initial debt. I adopt this interpretation for further
discussion.
In the first step, government knows y0, the probability distribution of the future states
and the price function which will be described below. It maximizes the value of the three
periods and chooses whether to reveal the information or not:
V0 = max{V FT0 , V NT0 },
where FT stands for the full transparency and NT for the null transparency cases. The
decision is taken before observing the state in which it will be tomorrow, therefore government
takes expectations over the endowment set. The value function, at time t = 0, is given by:
V0 = maxd={0,1},bi,1 dE
{
u(y0 + qi,1(bi,1)bi,1) + βV1(yi, bi,1)
}
(3.1)
+(1− d)E
{
u(y0 + qi,1(bi,1)bi,1) + βV1(yi, bi,1)
}
, ∀ i ∈ {b, c}
where d is an indicator if government is fully transparent or not.
In step 2, it observes the future endowment and, given the commitment it made in
the previous step, decides the level of debt. The sequence of events and decisions can be
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visualized in the timeline below, where in the upper part I specify the available information,
and below - the decisions government takes at each point of time.
t = 0
y0
FT or NT
yi
bi,1 t = 1
3.2.4 Lenders
The foreign lenders are risk neutral, act competitively and can lend or borrow any amount
in the outside market at a risk free interest rate, r. They have perfect information about
economy's state in period t = 0, but they do not observe the realization of the future
endowments. Instead, lenders know the future income distribution and can update their
beliefs about government's state by observing the repayment decision and the amount of
newly contracted debt.
Let the lenders' initial beliefs of government being in a boom, pi−1, equal to probability
of receiving a high endowment, 1 − λ. Given that government repays the debt in period
t = {0, 1}, lenders subjective probability that government is in a boom updates through
Bayes rule:
pit =
pit−1 Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Db,t−1} ∩ {bt = bb,t}
)
pit−1 Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Db,t−1} ∩ {bt = bb,t}
)
+ (1− pit−1) Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Dc,t−1} ∩ {bt = bc,t}
) .
(3.2)
The numerator, Pr
(
{bt−1 ≤ Di,t−1} ∩ {bt = bi,t}
)
takes into account the probability of
both facts: the government repaying the debt contracted in the previous period, bt−1 and
borrowing the optimal level bt = bi,t, ∀ ∈ {b, c}.
In period t = 2, government does not contract any debt, therefore beliefs are formed only
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upon observing the repayment decision. The lenders' beliefs in the last period are:
pi2 =
pi1 Pr
(
b2 ≤ Db,2
)
pi1 Pr
(
b2 ≤ Db,2
)
+ (1− pi1) Pr
(
b2 ≤ Dc,2
) . (3.3)
If government defaults in period t, it finds itself in a permanent autarky and is not allowed
to borrow. As a result, lenders form the beliefs only upon observing the default-repayment
decision:
pit =
pit−1 Pr
(
bt ≤ Db,t
)
pit−1 Pr
(
bt ≤ Db,t
)
+ (1− pit−1) Pr
(
bt ≤ Dc,t
) . (3.4)
For the full characterization of the problem, it's necessary to specify the beliefs off the
equilibrium path. I assume that, whenever government finds it optimal to default regardless
of its state, it is assumed to be in a boom.
Assumption 1. Lenders beliefs off the equilibrium paths are:
pit = 1 if Pr({bt−1 ≥ Db,t−1}) = Pr({bt−1 ≥ Dc,t−1}) = 1.
Lenders are competitive, therefore the price is determined by zero profit condition. They
brake even when the expected repayment, discounted at risk free rate, equals the value of
debt. Therefore, given lenders beliefs, the price is given by the expected probability of
repayment weighted by the likelihood of government being in one of each state. It follows
from the following equality:
qtbt = pit
Pr({bt < Db,t})
1 + r
bt + (1− pit)Pr({bt < Dc,t})
1 + r
bt. (3.5)
If the assets level is negative bt < 0, i.e. government saves, then the price equals to the
one paid for a risk free asset. If government is expected to default on debt in both states,
lenders offer a zero price and the only sustainable level of debt is, bt = 0. If government is
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expected to default in one of the states, the price is lower than the risk free one. As it will
be shown below, government is likelier to default during bad states. Therefore, under null
commitment government in good state will overpay for the issued debt and will underpay if
it is in the bad one. This trade-off ensures that for some conditions, government is willing
to reveal its state and for some conditions is willing to be silent.
3.3 Equilibrium characteristics
The competitive equilibrium of this economy can be defined as following:
Definition 3.3.1. A competitive equilibrium is: (i) a set of belief updating functions pi∗t
∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2}; (ii) a set of borrowing prices q∗1 and q∗2; (iii) a set of borrowing b∗1 and b∗2; (iv)
a set of transparency decisions d∗ such that:
1. b∗1, b
∗
2 and d
∗ solve the government's problem (3.1) given prices;
2. q∗1 and q
∗
2 are determined by market clearing condition (3.5);
3. beliefs pi∗t ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2} are consistent with Bayes rules (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4).
The strategy of each player (government and lenders) is the mapping from her information
set, that includes all the actions taken by the counterpart before her move, to each player's
action set.
3.3.1 Government's problem
Government's problem is solved backwards. In period 2, government's only decision is
whether to default or not. Government, being in state i ∈ {b, c}, repays if the level of
debt is lower than the threshold Di,2:
Di,2 =
δ − 1
δ
yi > yi, (3.6)
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where log(δ) = β(V ND − V D) is the discounted cost of default. Note, that the default
threshold is smaller than the maximum amount of debt implied by the feasibility constraint,
bi,2 − yi ≥ 0.
In period 1, government decides whether to default or not. And, if it repays, chooses the
optimal level of borrowing, bi,2:
bi,2 = arg maxbi,2 log(yi − bi,1 + qi,2(bi,2)bi,2) + βVi,2 (3.7)
Government repays, if the previous period contracted debt is lower than the default
boundary Di,1:
Di,1 = yi + q(bi,2)bi,2 − yi min
{(
δ
yi − bi,2
yi
)−β
, 1
}
< yi + q(bi,2)bi,2. (3.8)
Similar to the previous case, the default boundary is smaller than the feasible amount the
government can actually repay.
In period t = 0, government decides whether to be fully transparent or not, and the level
of borrowing, bi,1. It solves the following problem:
V0 = max{V FT0 , V NT0 },
where V j0 , ∀j ∈ {FT, NT} is given by:
V j0 = max
bji,1
E
{
u(y0 + q
j
i,1(b
j
i,1)b
j
i,1) + βV
j
i,1(yi, b
j
i,1)
}
, ∀i ∈ {b, c}. (3.9)
3.3.2 Full Transparency
The only piece of private information in the model is the government's future state. When
government decides to commit to reveal its state, it can borrow at a risk free rate any amount
of debt which is lower than the threshold Di,t. Since lenders perfectly observe government's
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fundamentals, they will not lend above the level government can repay next period. Hence,
the debt is riskless. Under full information case, due to endowment persistence government
that receives a higher endowment, is able to sustain a higher level of debt to output.
3.3.3 Null Transparency
When private information is present, lenders can not tell apart the state of the government,
unless the latter does any actions to reveal it. Therefore, they charge a higher interest rate,
expecting that government is also likely to be in a recession. If the government is in a boom,
it would like to signal about its state through the debt/default decision so that it can enjoy
the lower interest rates. The government in a crisis would like to mimic the actions of the
government in boom in order to take advantage of lower cost of borrowing and the possibility
of borrowing higher amount of debt, which otherwise would not be affordable.
The following lemma proves that there might exist a separating equilibria, where govern-
ment in good state repays and the government in bad state defaults.
Lemma 3.3.2. The default threshold for the government being in a boom is higher than the
one when it is in crisis, that is Db,t > Dc,t.
Proof: See Appendix.
In present model, there is only one piece of uncertainty, which is the endowment govern-
ment receives. Therefore, the actions taken by the government either reveal entirely its state
or not at all. Consequently, the lenders' beliefs regarding government's probability of being
in a good state will either update to one if the actions are revealing or stay the same if not.
If government chooses to be opaque and has not revealed its state so far, lenders can tell
apart the former's state only by observing a default. The reason is the following. Government
can borrow in the following two regions: (i) region, where the debt is lower than the threshold
the government in crisis can repay next period, bt < Dc,t; and (ii) one, where the debt is in
between the two thresholds of default, Dc,t < bt < Db,t. Government will not borrow more
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than it can repay in the good state, since the price for debt bt > Dc,t equals to zero. If
government contracts a level of debt in region (i), next period it will repay independent of
the received endowment. If government borrows in region (ii), it repays if it is in good state
and defaults otherwise. Therefore, lenders will be able to know government's state only if
it defaults. The revelation through the chosen level of debt is equivalent to playing the full
information. Note that it is the government that receives the low endowment would like to
mimic the actions of the one being in a boom. If it borrows a level of debt that is different
from the one it is optimal for the government in boom, then a priori government is better
off if it is transparent.
Note also that by the end of the game, in period t = 2, government will reveal its state
entirely. However, the information is relevant only in the first two periods, t = 0, 1. In
the final period, the government state does not affect any more the price or the debt level,
since the only decision it takes is whether to repay the outstanding debt or not. Hence,
even though the state of the government is revealed in equilibrium, lenders can not affect
any future debt decision. The following three lemmas formalize each one of the observed
equilibrium under null transparency.
Lemma 3.3.3 (Separating equilibrium). Suppose government borrows b1 > Dc,1 in period
t = 0, then its state is revealed in period t = 1.
Let b1 > Dc,1, then the state the nature draws is fully revealed in period 1. The gov-
ernment in boom repays the debt , b1 < Db,1, and contracts any amount of debt, b2 < Db,2
at a risk free interest rate. While the government in crisis defaults and stays in permanent
autarky.
Lemma 3.3.4 (Pooling equilibrium). Suppose the government borrows b1 < Dc,1 and
b2 > Dc,2, then the government's state is revealed in period t = 2.
Let b1 < Dc,1, and b2 > Dc,2, then government, independently of its state, repays the debt
b1 < Dc,1 < Db,1 in period t = 1 and defaults in period t = 2 if it finds itself in recession.
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Since government does not reveal its state in period 1, lenders carry on their beliefs that
government can be in a bad state with probability 1− λ. As a result, government in boom
will pay a higher cost for otherwise similar amount of debt if lenders knew its true state and
government in crisis will contract debt that otherwise would be unaffordable.
Lemma 3.3.5. Suppose the government borrows bt < Dc,t in any period t. Independently of
its state, government repays the debt entirely and private information is not revealed.
However some of these equilibria are not sustainable. The following propositions establish
the conditions and the type of equilibrium that arises in the problem.
Proposition 3.3.6. If government that is in boom finds optimal to contract a debt level
smaller than government in crisis can repay, bb,t < Dc,t, then for the latter will be optimal
to borrow bc,t 6= bb,t and reveal its type.
Proof. Assume government borrows the optimal level of debt b∗b,1 =
(1+q)
1+β(1+β)
yb− β1+β(1+β) 1qy0 <
Dc,1 and b
∗
b,2 =
yb
1+β
− β
1+β
1
q
(yb−b∗b,1) < Dc,2, where q = 11+r . Given that the maximum amount
of debt it can borrow is the one it can repay next period, the government in crisis either
mimics the actions of the one in boom or borrows the optimal amount of debt available at
a risk free rate. Since, b′2(b
∗
1) > 0 and b
∗′
1 (y) > 0, the government in crisis, which receives an
endowment yc < yb, is better of by borrowing b
∗
c,1 < b
∗
b,1 and bc,2(b
∗
c,1) < bb,2(b
∗
b,1). 
The intuition behind is the following. Since the government in boom finds it optimal to
borrow in the safe region, where the interest rate is (1 + r)−1, the government in crisis can
not mimic the former's actions by borrowing higher debt in the risky zone. In the safe region
the government in crisis can borrow any amount of debt and, since it receives a different
endowment, it is better off by borrowing a different from the booming government's debt
level.
Lemma 3.3.7. Government contracts a decreasing stream of debt over time, if it plays the
pooling equilibrium, that is b1 > b2.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3.3.8. The pooling equilibrium is not sustainable.
Proof. Assume there exist a pooling equilibrium, and there exist an optimal amount of debt
b2 > Dc,2, b1 < Dc,1 and b1 > b2 by lemma 3.3.7. Then, in period 2, the government in crisis
defaults and default threshold Dc,1 = qb2 < b2. It follows immediately that b1 < Dc,1 =
qb2 < b2. This is true only if b1 < b2, which contradicts the lemma 3.3.7. 
In present model, the only type of equilibrium which is optimal to play under the null
commitment is the separating equilibrium. It is not uncommon that in the signaling models
the only sustainable equilibrium is the separating one. The set of pooling equilibria is
generally sensitive to assumptions of the model and the beliefs that are off the equilibrium
path. In this environment, the government in crisis mimics the behavior of the government
in boom and contracts a high level of debt in the first period, on which it defaults eventually.
The government in boom overpays for the debt borrowed in the risky region and reveals its
type by repaying it next period. Therefore, in the second period it is able to borrow at a risk
free rate any amount below b2 < Dc,2. The benefits from higher debt if government is in crisis
and the costs that come from lower debt due to higher interest rate paid by the government
in boom generate the trade-off that ensures the optimal level of transparency. In the next
section, I will discuss which are the conditions that determine the level of transparency.
3.4 Optimal Transparency
The main question of this paper is to analyze the conditions when government chooses
to be less transparent. I will analyze the results in the following three dimensions: the
probability of having a crisis (λ), the initial endowment or the level of indebtedness (y0)
and the severeness of the crisis (y/y¯). The summary of the results is presented in figure
3.1 which depicts the regions of government commitment to be transparent or not about its
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CHAPTER 3. Optimal Transparency
wouldn't be able to borrow much. Hence, the benefits from mimicking the behavior of a
government in a good state are higher than the costs from paying a higher interest rate and
contracting a lower amount of debt when in boom.
Government's preferences to commit to reveal its state when probability of crisis is high
is less intuitive. However, it should be recalled that lenders know the probability distribu-
tion of states of economy. Since this determines directly the borrowing cost, higher is the
probability of receiving a low endowment higher is the cost of debt. In this case, the amount
of borrowing that a government in boom would be willing to contract in order to play the
separating equilibrium would be approaching the default threshold of the government in cri-
sis. Consequently, the latter would rather prefer contracting the debt in the risk free region
and be able to smooth the consumption by borrowing additionally in the next period. Since
government in boom is always better off when lenders know its type, government prefers
being fully transparent for high likelihood of being in a recession.
However, when government is less likely to experience a crisis, lenders offer a better price.
The actual net benefits from non-commitment strategy when government observes its state
increase and hence, its desire to be opaque. At the same time, lower is the likelihood of a
recession, lower are the expected benefits at the time when government does not know its
state, and higher is the willingness to be more transparent. Therefore, the optimal trans-
parency decision additionally depends on the degree a government is financially constrained
and the severeness of the potential crisis. As it was mentioned above, when government
is initially less indebted and/or expects the crisis to be less severe, it prefers to commit to
reveal its state.
The actual and expected cost / benefit graphs as functions of probability of receiving a
low endowment are plotted in figure 3.2. Benefits represent the surplus in welfare once the
government observes its bad state and it chosen to not disclose it to the general public. The
costs are the foregone welfare if the government prefers to be opaque and, eventually, receives
a high endowment. Figure 3.2a depicts the cost and benefits of being non transparent when
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CHAPTER 3. Optimal Transparency
the two states, the lower is the actual surplus and hence the desire to be non transparent.
Figure 3.2b shows the case when government has a relatively high initial endowment, y0,
and the expected costs surpass the expected benefits from being non-transparent. Although
the actual benefits from being opaque are higher, the probability of a crisis event is so low
that government is better off by committing to be fully transparent. The sudden jump to
zero depicts the point where the government that experiences a recession is better off by
revealing its state and contracting a level of debt that is different to the one if it were in a
boom. When the probability of crisis is high, the borrowing cost increases and government
in boom prefers a lower level of debt. Since the government is less financially constrained,
it prefers to smooth the consumption and to be able to borrow in both states rather than
defaulting on a level of debt that is marginally higher than its default threshold.
The mechanism above could be observed in two distinct crisis events, in Thailand (1997)
and in Greece (2009). Both of these economies, before the crisis, enjoyed higher than regional
and OECD GDP real growth values, low inflation and pegged exchange rates to strong
currencies like US dollar, and respectively Euro. As a result, they enjoyed low interest rates
which allowed them to accumulate an unsustainable level of debt. Also, as it turned out
later, suffered from lack of transparency in finance. Lower expectations about the upcoming
crisis allowed them to mimic the good government's behavior and rollover high levels of
foreign debt. However, once the regional and world economy have been hit by the financial
shocks, the growth slowed down and a series of irregularities and hidden transaction scandals
emerged. As a result, governments had to default due to surging borrowing costs.
Figure 3.3 plots the average level of debt to output ratios for expected and actual state
of economies. As it can be seen, the highest level of debt to GDP is attained by a non-
transparent bad economy. The lowest ratio is observed for the economy that is in crisis if
it is fully transparent. Therefore, an economy that expects a low endowment will always be
tempted to mimic good government's behavior so that it can enjoy a higher level of debt
and eventually higher consumption. Consistent with findings in the previous chapters, the
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CHAPTER 3. Optimal Transparency
like the opaqueness of financial sector in Thailand before 1997 crisis, hidden debts of local
governments in Spain, manipulation of statistics of Greek government show that there are
cases when a government prefers to be less transparent about its state of economy. In the
present paper, I tried to emphasize different economic conditions that makes governments
prefer being more opaque about its economic strength. In a model of endogenous sovereign
default, I found that a government prefers to be non transparent when it is overindebted,
expects a more severe crisis, but expects it with a lower probability.
When the probability of an upcoming crisis is low, price offered by lenders is very close to
the risk free interest rate. As a result, the cost from being opaque almost vanishes, while the
benefits if it is in bad state increase. Therefore, a highly indebted government that expects
along with lenders a booming economy prefers to be less transparent about its future state.
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.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3.2
It is straightforward from eq. (3.6) that Db,2 > Dc,2.
Db,1 > Dc,1. Let's consider the case of null information. Under null information, govern-
ment in a boom, in period 2, will default for higher level of debt than the one being in the
crisis. Also, government does not borrow more than b2 ≤ Db,2. Hence,
Db,1 = yb + q(b2)b2 − yb
(
δ
yb − b2
yb
)−β
> q(b2)b2.
The government in crisis will default for Db,2 ≥ b2 > Dc,2. Hence,
Dc,1 = yc + q(b2)b2 − yc = q(b2)b2 < Db,1. (10)
When the optimal level of debt is lower than the lower bound of default in period 2, the
government's problem is similar to the one under full information. The government in
crisis can borrow in period 1, only if the government in boom is not playing the separating
equilibrium, by contracting debt, b1 > Dc,1. Hence, in both periods, the government in boom
is contracting debt in the safe region, at a risk free rate. In this case, the government in crisis
does not find it optimal to mimic, as it is not able to take advantage of borrowing higher
amounts of debt than it is actually able to repay back. In both, pooling and separating
equilibria the government in crisis finds itself in default state in the last period. Therefore,
inequality 10 holds for all the cases under non-commitment strategy.
Under full information, government chooses the level of debt depending on the state, and
can borrow only in the risk free zone (qt = 1/(1 + r)). The optimal level of debt contracted
in period 1,2 are bi,1 =
(1+q)
1+β(1+β)
yi− β1+β(1+β) 1qy0 and bi,2 = yi1+β − β1+β 1q (yi− bi,1), respectively.
And the default threshold level for the government being in state i ∈ {b, c} is:
Di,1 = yi + qbi,2 − yi
(
δ(1− bi,2
yi
)
)−β
.
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Under full information, lenders observe the type of government therefore they will not lend
more than government is able to repay, therefore the min term disappears, where
(
δ(1 −
b2,i
yi
)
)−β
< 1. Let's check if the inequality Db,1 −Dc,1 > 0 is true.
Db,1 −Dc,1 = yb + qbb,2 − yb
(
δ(1− bb,2
yb
)
)−β
−
(
yc + qbc,2 − yc
(
δ(1− bc,2
yc
)
)−β)
.
Normalizing yb = 1, and plugging in the optimal solutions for bi,j, ∀i ∈ {b, c} and
∀j ∈ {1, 2}, the following inequality holds:
δβ(1− γ + q(bb,2 − bc,2)) >
(
(1− bb,2
1
)
)−β
− γ
(
(1− bc,2
γ
)
)−β
,
and, respectively,
δβ(1− γ)
(
1 +
q
1 + β
(
1 +
β
q
q − β(1 + β)
1 + β(1 + β)
))
>
(
1− bb,2
1
)−β
− γ
(
1− bc,2
γ
)−β
(11)
Hence, Db,1 > Dc,1 holds for both, full and null information cases.
.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3.7
The government solves the following problem when it is playing the pooling equilibrium:
max
b1,b2
log(y0 +
1
1+r
b1) + β log(y¯ − b1 + 1−λ1+r b2) + β2 log(y¯ − b2) + βV Ndef (12)
s.t. D1,c − b1 ≥ 0, (13)
where D1,c = qb2, as the government in crisis is not able to repay in period 3.
For, γ ≥ 0, the F.O.C. wrt to b2 is:
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1− λ
1 + r
u′(c1)− βu′(c2) + γ 1− λ
1 + r
= 0.
The following inequalities hold:
1− λ
1 + r
u′(c1)− βu′(c2) ≤ 1− λ
1 + r
u′(c1)− βu′(c2) + γ 1− λ
1 + r
= 0, (14)
and
u′(c1) ≤ β(1 + r)
1− λ u
′(c2). (15)
Let's consider the case when the constraint is not binding, γ = 0, then
u′(c1) =
β(1 + r)
1− λ u
′(c2). (16)
Given β(1 + r) = 1, then β(1+r)
1−λ > 1 and u
′(c1) > u′(c2). Hence, y¯ − b1 + 1−λ1+r b2 < y¯ − b2 and
b1 > (1 +
1−λ
1+r
)b2 > b2.
Let's consider the case when constraint is binding, γ > 0 and D1,c = b
∗
1 = qb2. By
definition of pooling equilibria, government in good time finds optimal to contract b∗2 > D2,c.
Let's assume that the government in crisis finds it optimal to mimic government in boom
and contracts the same level of debt. The government in crisis then consumes its endowment
in period 1 and defaults in period 2. Hence, the terminal value of utility in period 2, equals
to V Def . As a result, it has the following utility function:
V0(b
∗
1, b
∗
2) = log(y0 +
1
1 + r
b∗1) + β log(y) + β
2 log(y) + β3V Def .
The same stream of consumption government in crisis can have if it consumes b2 = 0 and
hence not default in the last period. Therefore, the terminal value of consumption is V NDef >
V Def and the utility obtained by mimicking the government in boom is lower, V0(b
∗
1, b
∗
2) <
V0(b
∗
1, b2) = 0. As a result government in crisis finds it optimal to deviate and the equilibrium
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when the constraint is binding is not sustainable.
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Closing Remarks
In the present work, I study different aspects of government transparency in a model of
endogenous sovereign default. In part I, I find that a more informed government is able to
sustain and rollover higher levels of debt. Part II emphasizes the conditions when government
prefers to be opaque about its state of economy. It shows that government prefers to be less
transparent when it is highly indebted, expects a more pronounced recession, but with lower
probability.
The thesis is a contribution to literature that study models of endogenous sovereign
defaults and asymmetric information that appears among the market participants. However,
further research can improve our understanding about the issues covered in the present work.
I will suggest several points that could be interesting to develop further:
• The model described in part I can be improved by relaxing the assumption that lenders
are constantly irrational and do not update their signal after observing government's
debt. In order to set up a signal extracting problem one should add an additional noise
to the problem. One potential source of noise can be the current level of endowment.
In such an environment, lenders are not able to disentangle whether the higher debt
decision comes from expected higher endowment or lower current output received by
the government. Firstly, solving such a problem will be a contribution to the existing
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literature. To my best knowledge, in such type of models, agents are not choosing an
optimal level of debt, but rather are given the option to choose a particular exogenous
level of debt or default.1 Additionally, signal extraction models might bring additional
insights to government's behavior and contracted levels of debt.
• Following the above idea and related to the model in part II, it will be interesting to
study a model where government can choose the optimal noisiness of the signal or the
amount of information it provides to lenders. The problem is interesting to analyze
with respect to level of contracted debt as well as in relation to the other government
instruments like taxes. Similar to monetary policy transparency idea, government
may increase the total welfare if general public is less aware of the expected taxes. If
investors expect an increase in taxes, they might be less interested in bringing their
money into the economy. At the same time, they are less likely to invest in less
transparent economies. Therefore, government may be willing to choose a middle
point so that it can extract most of the benefit.
• Another interesting contribution would be to find a way to quantify the signals and
use it, eventually, for quantitative research and policy analysis. One way to tackle
this problem is to construct signal noisiness indicators based on surveys of profes-
sional forecasters or other indices that measure economic uncertainty and government
transparency.
1See for example Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005)
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